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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. This appeal is subject to assignment and has 
been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code 
Annotated. (Rec. 1298 & 1303). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs bad faith claim on 
summary judgment, when there were issues of fact present? 
Standard of Review: Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. All facts and inferences are to be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with no deference given to the trial court. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97 (Utah 2003). 
Preservation for Review: This was raised in Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Rec. 509-593) and 
was ruled on by the trial court. (Minute Entry, Rec. 935-941; Order Rec. 944-945). 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err in refusing to allow Plaintiffs expert to testify 
when he was properly designated and scheduled to testify at trial? 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to disallow expert testimony 
based on evidentiary grounds is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994). However, in this case the testimony was 
excluded as a matter of law; and therefore should be reviewed under the correctness 
standard. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000). 
Preservation for Review: The trial court knew Plaintiffs expert was 
scheduled to testify on Thursday at noon, as part of Plaintiff s case in chief (Rec. 1305, 
Trial Trans, pgs. 178-179, 252-254) but granted Defendants' Motion for a Directed 
Verdict Thursday morning, before Plaintiffs expert could testify. (Rec. 1195-1210). 
3. Issue: Did the Plaintiff, as the insured, have the burden to prove that the 
fire in her home was "accidental" as part of'her prima facie case, to seek recovery under 
her fire insurance Policy? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000); State v. Leyva, 
951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation for Review: This issue was preserved for review when the 
trial court granted the Motion for Directed Verdict based on Plaintiffs alleged failure to 
establish her prima facie case. (Rec. 1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
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4. Issue: Does the fact that Plaintiff had a fire insurance Policy in effect on 
her home, with the premiums paid, and that she was entitled to payment under the Policy 
for her fire loss, as stipulated to by the Insurance Company at trial, and ruled by the court 
as an admitted fact; sufficiently establish a prima facie case for the Plaintiff, to shift the 
burden of proving arson to the Insurance Company? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (UtApp. 2000); State v. Leyva, 
951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation for Review: Plaintiff began to put on evidence regarding 
these matters (Rec. 1304, pg 21-23) when the Insurance Company stipulated to these facts 
and the court ruled that the same was an admitted fact. (Rec. 1304, pg. 23) The court 
subsequently granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict due to Plaintiff alleged 
failure to establish her prima facie case. (Rec. 1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
5. Issue: Is expert testimony necessary for an insured to present an issue of 
fact for the jury, as to whether a fire was intentionally set or accidental; or whether the 
insured had any involvement in starting or arranging the fire? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000). 
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Preservation for Review: The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for 
Directed Verdict based on Plaintiffs failure to put on expert testimony that the fire was 
"accidental." (Rec. 1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
6. Issue: Even if Plaintiff s expert was only designated as a rebuttal witness, 
did the trial court err in refusing to allow him to testify, when the Insurance Company, 
before moving for directed verdict, elected to proceed with its own evidence and called its 
fire expert to put on evidence in support of its affirmative defense of arson? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000). 
Preservation for Review: The trial court granted the Motion for Directed 
Verdict after Defendant's fire expert was allowed to testify regarding the cause of the fire 
and Plaintiffs possible involvement, but did not allow Plaintiffs expert to testify in 
rebuttal. (Rec. 1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
7. Issue: Did the Insurance Company waive its right for a directed verdict 
based solely on Plaintiffs alleged case in chief, when before moving for directed verdict, 
it elected to proceed with its own witnesses at trial, and elected to put on evidence of its 
affirmative defense of arson? 
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Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000); State v. Leyva, 
951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation for Review: This issue was preserved for review when the 
trial court granted the Motion for Directed Verdict before the close of Plaintiff s 
evidence, but after the Defendant had proceeded to put on its own evidence regarding the 
cause of the fire, with its fire expert, and Plaintiffs possible motive for setting the fire, 
with a health inspector and insurance investigator. (Rec. 1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
8. Issue: Was there any evidence introduced in this case, before the Motion 
for Directed Verdict was made, to raise an issue of fact for the jury to decide, precluding 
the entry of a directed verdict, including the cause of the fire and/or Plaintiffs 
involvement in the start of the fire? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's order granting a directed 
verdict, the appellate court examines whether any evidence was introduced at trial to raise 
an issue of fact for the jury. Aha Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Service, 930 
P.2d 280 (Ut.App. 1996) cert, denied. All evidence and inferences are to be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. The standard of review on a directed 
verdict is the same as that imposed on the trial court. It is reviewed as a matter of law for 
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correctness. Mahmoodv. Ross, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). 
Preservation for Review: This issue was preserved for review when the 
trial court granted the Motion for Directed Verdict after evidence was presented to the 
jury regarding the cause of the fire, as well as, Plaintiffs possible motives for setting the 
fire, and involvement in the start of the fire. (Rec. 1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
9. Issue: Did the trial court err in allowing the Insurance Company to move 
for a directed verdict, and granting a directed verdict, before the close of Plaintiff s 
evidence, knowing that Plaintiffs expert was to testify later that day? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000); State v. Leyva, 
951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation for Review: This issue was preserved for review when the 
trial court granted the Motion for Directed Verdict before the close of Plaintiff s 
evidence, knowing that Plaintiffs expert was scheduled to testify later that day. (Rec. 
1195-1201; Rec. 1209-1210). 
10. Issue: Did the trial court err in dismissing a jury trial pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000). 
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Preservation for Review: This issue was preserved for review when the 
trial court granted the Motion for Directed Verdict based on Rule 41(b). (Rec. 1201). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings: 
The Plaintiff/Appellant, Leigh Young aka Hardy ("Leigh") suffered from a 
fire in her home in Sandy, Utah, which started at approximately 6:45 a.m., the morning of 
July 26, 2001, when no one was home. Leigh had a fire insurance policy, which was in 
effect at the time, with the Defendant/Appellee, Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Insurance 
Company"). Leigh submitted claims to her Insurance Company for living expenses which 
the Insurance Company paid. Claims were also submitted regarding damage to her home 
and personal property, however, six months after the fire, in January 2002, the Insurance 
Company sent a letter denying these claims, claiming arson, under the Policy's Intentional 
Act Exclusion. (See January 2002 letter, Trial Ex. 16). 
Leigh filed this action on July 21, 2004, (Rec. 1-6) alleging bad faith on the 
part of the Insurance Company and breach of contract on the insurance Policy, for the 
Insurance Company's refusal to fully investigate or pay the claims. Leigh obtain a fire 
expert, Mr. Fred King from Delta, Colorado, who was timely designated as an expert 
witness. (Rec. 58-59) Mr. King was of the opinion that the earlier investigation of the fire 
7 
failed to properly eliminate any and all accidental sources for the fire. Mr. King opined 
that the fire was a flashover fire, and could have been caused by a number of accidental 
sources, which were not eliminated as a possibility, including a "classic mattress fire." 
(King Expert Report, Rec. 63-73). Mr. King was designated as an expert, his expert 
report was timely filed, and his deposition was taken.(Rec. 166-167). After Mr. King was 
designated as an expert and filed his report, the Defendant designated Mr. Jay Freeman, 
as a fire expert. (Rec. 154-165). 
Depositions were taken and affidavits obtained by both parties; and on 
March 14, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to 
dismiss Plaintiffs bad faith claim. (Rec. 173-175) On March 15, 2006, Plaintiff also 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on her breach of contract claim. (Rec. 419-421) 
This was accompanied with the Affidavit of Leigh Young, explaining her activities at the 
time of the fire (Rec. 442-447) and the fact that she did not set the fire, or arrange to have 
the fire set. (Rec. 447). Leigh argued that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
based on the undisputed fact that the Policy was in effect at the time of the fire, and there 
was no evidence that she had set the fire, but mere speculation. (Rec.422-508). The 
Insurance Company in their Motion for Summary Judgment claimed that there were 
issues of fact sufficient to refuse payment under the Policy, and that the court should 
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dismiss the bad faith claim as a matter of law. (Rec. 176-418). The Insurance Company 
never claimed that Leigh had not met her prima facie case, or that the fire did not fall 
under the terms of the Policy, rather the Insurance Company asserted its affirmative 
defense of arson and that it had a "fairly debatable" defense to not pay the claims. (Rec. 
176-206). 
On August 7, 2006, the court issued its ruling on the cross-motions for 
summary judgment, ruling that there were issues of fact to preclude Leigh's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but that the Insurance Company was entitled to have the bad faith 
claim dismissed as a matter of law, based on the presences of these factual issues. (Rec. 
935-940). The court further ruled that for the Insurance Company to establish its prima 
facie case of arson to deny coverage under the insurance policy, it had to show (1) that the 
fire was incendiary in nature, (2) the insured had a financial motive for setting the fire, 
and (3) unexplained surrounding circumstantial evidence implicating the suspect, citing 
Lawson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 318 (Colo.App. 1978). (Rec. 939). 
The court then went on to find factual issues regarding these elements. (Rec. 936-939). 
The matter was set for an eight day jury trial to commence Tuesday 
November 28th 2006 and conclude December 7th 2006. (Rec. 950-953). The parties made 
pretrial disclosures of witnesses and exhibits. Leigh designated Fred King as her fire 
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expert in her pre-trial disclosures. (Rec. 995). Counsel for the parties discussed the 
timing of witnesses that they planned to call and prepared a stipulation for the entry of 
certain exhibits, in order to facilitate time at trial. These exhibits, which were later 
admitted into evidence, included: the Insurance Policy, the Proof of Loss Claims with 
attached inventories, the January 2002 denial letter from the Insurance Company, the 
Written Statement from Steve Johnson, and Pictures of the fire scene. (Reel 150-1151). 
Counsel for the parties also submitted stipulated jury instructions 
regarding the remaining breach of contract claim and the Insurance Company's defenses, 
including a jury instruction that the Insurance Company has the burden to prove arson by 
a preponderance of the evidence. This instruction was stipulated to by the parties. There 
was no dispute to the fact that the fire was a covered catastrophe under the Insurance 
Policy. There were no instructions prepared addressing the issue of coverage or that it is 
the Plaintiffs burden to show the fire was accidental to obtain coverage. The issue for 
trial was whether or not there was arson by the Insured to prohibit recovery under the 
Intentional Act Exclusion of the Policy 
Trial commenced on Tuesday November 28th and opening statements were 
made. Again there was no argument of the fact that the fire was a catastrophe covered 
under the Policy, that the fire occurred in Leigh's home, and that the Policy was in effect 
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at the time of the fire. The issue, according to the Insurance Company, was whether or 
not the fire was intentionally set by Leigh. (Rec. 1304, Trans, pg. 9). 
After opening statements, Leigh testified similar to the statements made in 
her affidavit for summary judgment, (when the court previously found issues of fact for 
the jury) that she had owned the home at 9950 Marble Street since November, 1983, 
(Rec. 1304, pg.17), that in her divorce the home was quit-claimed to her (Rec. 1304, pg. 
20, Trial Ex.2), that the mortgage payments on the home were current at the time of the 
fire, that there were no balloon or large payments due at the end of the mortgage (Rec. 
1304, pg. 22, Trial Ex. 3), that the Plaintiff had obtained fire insurance on her home from 
the Defendant, Insurance Company, (Rec. 1304, pg. 22-23), and that the premiums for the 
Policy were paid and were current at the time of the fire, (Rec. 1304, pg. 23). In fact, it 
was admitted by Defendant at trial, that the Policy was in effect at the time of the fire, and 
that all the terms and conditions of the Policy, as far as Plaintiffs entitlement to payment 
under the Policy, were met. This was an admitted fact by stipulation and by the court's 
ruling. (Rec. 1304, pg. 23). 
Leigh further testified that the last time she was in the home before the fire 
occurred (on the morning of July 26, 2001) was late at night on July 24, 2001, and she did 
not notice anything unusual in the home. (Rec. 1304, pg. 25). She testified that she then 
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left and stayed that night at the Travel Lodge in Salt Lake City, with her husband Doug 
Young. They had done this before in the past. Doug's brother worked at the hotel, and 
would give them a discount. (Rec. 1304, pg. 26-27). Leigh also testified as to the 
appliances and furniture, which were in the room where the fire started. (Rec. 1304, pgs. 
29-32) She testified about the repairs that were currently being made to the home. (Rec. 
1304, pgs. 34-35). Leigh further testified that she did not start the fire and that she did 
not know of the fire until she was called at the Travel Lodge by her son's girlfriend, 
Kelly, at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 that morning. (Rec. 1304, pgs. 35-36). Leigh 
testified that she was surprised by the fire. Her Insurance Company was contacted, and a 
representative arrived that night. (Rec. 1304, pgs. 34-35). Leigh testified that she did not 
know how the fire started and asked the insurance representative "how the fire started? " 
but received no response. (Rec. 1304, pg. 38). 
Leigh further testified to the damage from the fire, both to her personal 
property and her home; and that after the fire she was overwhelmed so she hired 
Adjusters International, a professional adjusting company, to inventory her personal 
property, prepare an estimate for the damage to her home, and to deal with the Insurance 
Company in submitting the necessary forms for her loss, which Adjustors International 
did. (Rec. 1304, pgs. 41-43). Leigh also testified that she rented a home and that the 
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Insurance Company began paying living expenses under the Policy (Rec. 1304, pgs. 49-
51), and never claimed that she was not entitled to payment under the Policy or that the 
fire was not a covered catastrophe under the Policy. However, six months later, in 
January of 2002, the Insurance Company sent a letter denying any further payment based 
on the Intentional Act Exclusion of the Policy, claiming that she intentionally set the fire 
or arranged for the fire. (Rec. 1304, pgs. 51-52; January 2002 letter, Trial Ex. 16). 
At trial the court constantly cut off Leigh's testimony and would not let her 
fully answer the questions she was asked. The court did not allow her to testify about 
how she felt about the fire, although her state of mind was a relevant issue in the case as 
to any possible motive she may have had to set the fire. (Rec. 1304, pg. 37). Leigh also 
testified as to her financial condition; that she continued to make the house payments after 
the fire until July of 2003, when she finally sold the home in its burned condition. (Rec. 
1304, pgs. 52-53) Leigh also presented a video of the room where the fire started and 
testified about an outlet in the room where the wires had melted together. (Rec. 1304, pg. 
56). The court would not let her testify as to many items, including her emotional state 
and her feelings about the fire, and the loss of her personal belongings, although the court 
had previously ruled such issues were factors for the jury to decide. (Rec. 939). 
13 
Vaughn Bradley of Century Builders testified regarding the estimate 
he prepared to repair the dwelling after the fire. He testified that the bid he prepared was 
accurate and reasonable.(Rec. 1304, Pgs. 85-90) His repair was admitted into evidence. 
(Rec. 1304, pgs. 85-90, Trial Ex. 10). The court also rushed Mr. Bradley through his 
testimony. 
After Mr. Bradley the Plaintiff did not have any more witnesses ready to 
call, so the Defendant, without objection or making any motion to dismiss or for directed 
verdict, began calling its own witnesses in support its affirmative defense of arson, i.e., 
that the fire was intentionally set. Defendant first called Mr. Bebee an investigator for the 
Insurance Company who testified that the fire seemed to be intentional (Rec. 1304, pg. 
101), because the Plaintiff was not in her home at the time of the fire and the fire was 
discovered by several neighbors who were leaving for work the morning of July 26, 2001, 
at 6:45 a.m. (Rec. 1304, pg. 101). Mr. Bebee also testified about the background check 
he did on Leigh, including court records, and her financial situation; putting on evidence 
of a possible financial motive for the fire. (Rec. 1304, pg. 102) Mr. Bebee also testified 
about two conversations he allegedly had with Leigh regarding the last time she was at 
the house, claiming that she told him that she was there the night of the fire, July 25th 
rather than July 24th (Rec. 1304, pg. 104); thus creating issues of fact regarding Leigh's 
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involvement in the start of the fire. 
On the next morning of trial, Nathaniel Cook of Adjusters International 
testified as to the procedures he used to inventory and value the personal property and in 
preparing the Proof of Loss Claims for the personal property and for the dwelling. The 
Proof of Loss Claims and attached inventories, were admitted into evidence. (Trial Exhs. 
10-12). The judge also cut Mr. Cook short on his testimony and would not allow 
questions about the individual items of inventory. (Rec. 1305, pgs. 108-135). 
Tim's friend, Brandon Yates, testified next. He testified that he was at the 
house the night of the fire with a group of friends. They had "nowhere else to go to 
smoke and drink," and they knew that Leigh was not home, so they went to the house. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 137). They were drinking alcohol, smoking and playing video games. 
There were two mattresses in the room one on the floor and one on the bed. (Rec. 1305, 
pg. 137). They moved the TV on to a wood table that was in the middle of the room. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 137). Not only were the boys smoking on the mattresses, but they also lit 
candles at various places through out the room (Rec. 1305, pg. 137). No one from the 
fire department or the Insurance Company contacted or talked to Brandon Yates, about 
being in the room that mght. (Rec. 1305, pg. 141). Brandon testified that they were drunk 
that night and that he was the first person to leave, but he didn't check to see if all the 
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candles were out. (Rec. 1305, pg. 145). Brandon also testified that his friend Chad Smith, 
who was there that night, drove over in a gold colored pickup truck, that was newer but 
looked a lot like Doug Young's truck. (Rec. 1305, pg. 146). 
Leigh's son, Tim Hardy, also testified that without Leigh's knowledge or 
consent, he was at the home the night of the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 150). Tim testified that 
he was there with several friend, watching TV, playing video games and hanging out in 
the room where the fire started. They were drinking alcohol, smoking cigarets and 
marijuana, and lighting candles in the room. (Rec. 1305, pg. 150-151) He also testified 
that Chad Smith was there and had driven over in his Ford Ranger pickup truck, that 
looked a lot like Doug Young's truck.1 (Rec. 1305, pg. 152). Tim was never contacted by 
anyone from the fire department or from the Insurance Company, about being in the room 
that night, a few hours before the fire started. (Rec. 1305, pg. 155). 
Grant Sumsion, an attorney helping Leigh with her insurance claim at the 
time testified that he had talked to Tim and his friends, that were at the house that night 
and that he had relayed this information to the Insurance Company. (Rec. 1305, pgs. 161-
162). Leigh's friend Janet Sherwood testified that she knew Leigh was trying to fix up 
]The written statement of Steve Johnson, which was admitted into evidence by 
stipulation (Rec. 1150-1151) indicated that he saw a Ford Ranger parked in front of the 
house on July 26, 2001 between the hours of 12:00 - 2:00 a.m. (Trial Ex. 25) 
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the house, and was doing major repairs to the house at the time, and that furniture and 
boxes of items were stacked in certain areas, so they could replace the carpet. (Rec. 1305, 
pgs. 168-169). After Janet Sherwood, Plaintiff still had an electrician scheduled to 
testify, Mr. Chris Johnson, and her fire expert, Mr. Fred King, who was coming from 
Colorado. The court asked if Plaintiff was prepared to rest and Plaintiff said no. Plaintiff 
still intended to call the electrician, Mr. Chris Johnson, and her fire expert, Mr. King, who 
was scheduled to testify on Friday. The court indicated, "well, but he's not going to be 
here until Friday and here we are at Wednesday and you can't rest. (Rec. 1305, pg. 176). 
The court then asked the Defendant if it had any more witnesses it would be 
willing to call at the time. Defendant's expert, Mr. Freeman, was in Sacramento, and he 
also couldn't be in Utah until Friday. (Rec. 1305, pg. 176). The Defendant then indicated 
that it may waive his testimony, based on the testimony of the fire marshall, Richard 
Lyman. (Rec. 1305, pg. 177). The court then asked Plaintiffs counsel if he could call 
Mr. King during the noon recess, to get him to court any sooner. (Rec. 1305, pg. 177). 
Mr. King was contacted during the noon recess and arrangements were made to have him 
in court the next day, Thursday, at noon. At the start of the afternoon session the court 
asked the Plaintiff if it had any other witnesses other than Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Fred 
King, and Plaintiff indicated that he had subpoenaed Steve Johnson, but these were 
17 
Plaintiffs last witnesses. (Rec. 1305, pg. 178). It was discussed that Steve Johnson may 
appear the next morning at trial to be questioned and that Mr. Fred King would be on the 
stand by noon on Thursday. The court indicated, u[a]ll right on that basis then we'll 
proceed." (Rec. 1305, pg. 179). 
Chris Johnson, the electrician was called and testified that he had observed 
the outlet in the room where the fire had started and had seen the melted and burned wires 
in the electrical outlet. (Rec. 1305, pg. 182). At the end of Mr. Johnson's testimony, the 
court asked Plaintiffs counsel, subject to the last witness you have, you rest? To which 
counsel responded yes. Plaintiffs last witness, being Mr. King, Plaintiffs fire expert. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 183). The court then asked the Defendant if it was willing to proceed 
with additional witnesses at this time. (Rec. 1305, pg. 183). 
Defendant's counsel indicated that it was, and Defendant called several of 
its own witnesses, including: Craig Weinheimer - a health inspector; Mr. Richard Lyman 
- the Sandy City Fire Marshall; and Rex Nelson - a dog handler. No objection was made 
by the Insurance Company to calling these witnesses out of turn. No motion was made 
for directed verdict on the evidence then presented; and no objection was made to 
allowing the Plaintiff to wait until noon the next day to call her fire expert. Defendant's 
witnesses were called and cross examined. 
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Mr. Craig Weinheimer, the housing officer, was called to testify regarding a 
referral from Sandy Police regarding the condition of the house (Rec. 1305, pg.186); the 
condition of the home he observed on a visit to the house (Rec. 1305, pgs. 188-189); an 
appointment he had with Leigh on July 26, 2001, the day of the fire (Rec. 1305, pg. 191); 
and the fact that he had faxed a copy of his report and the Sandy Police referral to DCFS. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 193). Mr. Weinheimer was cross-examined, and admitted that he only 
saw the house for five minutes through the screen door; that he did not have authority to 
condemn, but could only close the home to occupancy; and that he never threatened to 
close the house, but eluded the possibility. (Rec. 1305, pg. 197). There was also no action 
taken by DCFS and he was never contacted by DCFS on his referral. (Rec. 1305, pg. 
197). He testified that no one was staying in the home at the time, and that even if closed 
to occupancy the owner can still go into the home to icmodel and make repairs, and that 
this is in fact encouraged to remedy any health concerns. (Rec. 1305, pg. 196-197). 
Richard Lyman, the Sandy City Fire Marshall, was called and allowed to 
testify as a cause and origin expert.(Rec. 1305, pg. 202-204). His report and investigation 
regarding the start of the fire, was admitted into evidence (Rec. 1305, pg. 205). There 
were no occupants in the home at the time of the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 206). His report 
included his opinion, as to the room where the fire started (Rec. 1305, pg. 209) and the 
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likely point of origin. (Rec. 1305, pg. 209). The photos relied upon were stipulated to 
and received into evidence. (Rec. 1305, pg. 209). There was no concrete evidence 
regarding the burn patterns, but it was believed to be a flashover fire, i.e., where the heat 
builds up so everything in the room ignites at the same time. (Rec. 1305, pg. 215 & 229). 
Mr. Lyman testified that with the dresser and walls intact and the uniform burning, it was 
believed that the fire was more in the center of the room. (Rec. 1305, pg. 216). He also 
testified that the sagging in the mattress springs indicated there was more heat in that area 
of the room. (Rec. 1305, pg. 218). He testified the most likely area where the fire started 
was the center of the room. (Rec. 1305, pg. 219). He didn't note any legitimate source of 
ignition in that area, and could not determine any cause of the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 219). 
He had no evidence that Leigh was involved in the start of the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 222). 
On the cross-examination of Mr. Lyman, numerous issues were raised 
regarding his investigation, including the fact that under the National Fire Protection 
Agency guidelines, a fire is not to be determined as intentionally set until all possible 
accidental sources have been eliminated. (Rec. 1305, pg. 223). Mr. Lyman failed to 
check all the outlets or electrical appliances in the room. (Rec. 1305, pg. 224, 229). He 
didn't notice an outlet with burned or melted wires, or an extension cord that was plugged 
into one of the outlets. (Rec. 1305, pg. 229). He indicated that there was a lot of heat 
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produced in the mattress springs and that could have been involved in the cause of the 
fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 224). He admitted that the debris the dog hit on could have been 
pulled down from the ceiling. (Rec. 1305, pg. 225). He was also not sure what the part 
was that the accelerant dog hit on. He thought it was a automobile part, then a computer 
monitor or possibly a television part. (Rec. 1305, pg. 228). He did not have the part at 
trial or any lab results identifying the part or any accelerant on the part. 
Mr. Lyman later learned that Tim Hardy, Brandon Yates, and their friends, 
were in the home the night of the fire, but he did not talk to them in preparing his report. 
(Rec. 1305, pg.231). He testified that this information would be important and that his 
report could change with this new information. (Rec. 1305, pg. 232). Plaintiff attempted 
to find out how his report would change with this additional information, but the court 
would not allow such questioning. (Rec. 231). 
Furthermore, since Mr. Lyman's report was admitted into evidence, the 
court would not allow Plaintiffs attorney to ask him questions regarding the findings in 
his report. The court indicated, "the report speaks for itself. I'm not going to have you 
stand here for the next 30 minutes and question him about what is says. So the objection 
-so the question is out of order." (Rec. 1305, pg. 236).2 
2When the court later ruled on directed verdict that there was no evidence 
presented regarding the cause of the fire, the court had not read, nor did it indicate that it 
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The Defendant next called Rex Nelson, the dog handler to testify about the 
accerlarant dog. He testified that before the dog went in he had the mattress springs 
removed (Rec. 1305, pg. 241) and that the dog actually hit in an area that was in the 
northeast area of the room, not the center; and that they had to dig down through the 
debris to find the suspect part. (Rec. 1305, pg.247). The part looked like a screen or 
something you would take out of a car. (Rec. 1305, pg. 248). He was questioned regarding 
possible contamination of the fire scene. He was not the one to remove the debris and he 
did not preserve the part or any other debris for trial. (Rec. 1305, pg 249). 
After Mr. Lyman, the Defendant did not have any more witnesses to call 
that afternoon. The Defendant's only other witnesses were Mr. Pace, a Sandy Police 
officer, who saw the condition of the home before the fire; and Mr. Lew Kanizer, an 
estimator for the Insurance Company. Bother were out of Town. One was in Las Vegas, 
the other in Arizona. (Rec. 1305, pg. 250-251). 
The court released the jury saying, "I can tell you this case is going to wrap 
up tomorrow, one way or another." Please be back tomorrow at 9:00 and we will finish 
the evidence at that point. (Rec. 1305, pg. 251). After the jury was released, the 
Defendant indicated that Mr. Freeman was tied up in California and couldn't be in court 
had considered any of the reports, statements, photographs, or other documents which 
were received into evidence, regarding the investigation of the fire. 
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tomorrow, and wouldn't be available until Friday. (Rec. 1305, pg. 252). The court 
indicated that regardless, "the case is going to finish tomorrow." (Rec. 1305, pg. 252). 
The court indicated that it would hear from Plaintiffs fire expert, Mr. King, at noon on 
Thursday, "we'll defer our lunch and we'll hear him at 12:00, and then we'll argue, and 
instruct, and send it out to the jury. (Rec. 1305, pg. 252-253). Defendant's counsel asked 
if the Plaintiff had rested and the court indicated, "of course, he hasn't. Because he 
hasn't got all of his witnesses here." (Rec. 1305, pg. 253). The Defendant complained 
that Plaintiffs expert was a rebuttal witness and therefore, since she couldn't call her 
other fire expert, Mr. Freeman, who couldn't be there until Friday, that Plaintiff should 
not be able to call Mr. King, regarding the cause of the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 253-254). 
The court stated that Mr. King was identified as a rebuttal witness, but does 
not say that his rebuttal was limited only to Mr. Freeman's testimony and not Mr. 
Lyman's report; nor does the court identify any official document, filed by the Plaintiff, 
listing Mr. King, as merely a rebuttal witness to Mr. Freeman's testimony. (Rec. 1305, pg. 
253). It was known by both the parties and the court, that the Plaintiff intended to call Mr. 
King as part of her case, regardless of the testimony of Mr. Lyman or Mr. Freeman.3 He 
3Plaintiff wras asked several times if "Plaintiff rests," and Plaintiff clearly indicated 
that she still intended to call her expert, Mr. King, to testify. (Rec. 1305 pgs. 176 & 183) 
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was scheduled to testify at noon the next day, before Mr. Freeman was scheduled to 
testify on Friday. (Rec. 1305, pg. 252). 
On the morning of November 30th the third day of trial, Defendant's counsel 
again complained that Mr. Freeman, was not going to be able to testify until Friday, so 
Plaintiffs fire expert, Mr. King, should not be able to testify. (Rec. 1197). To the extent 
Mr. King's testimony was to be in rebuttal to Mr. Lyman's testimony, it was argued 
(contrary to Defendant's prior waiver and agreement to proceed with its own witnesses 
while waiting for Mr. King) that Mr. King should have been put on earlier, and (contrary 
to what the court ruled, and was obvious to everyone at the end of the day on Wednesday) 
that the Plaintiff had rested. (Rec. 1305, pg. 1187). It was argued that there was no 
evidence that the fire was accidental, entitling the Defendant to a directed verdict. (Rec. 
1198). An argument was also made as to the value placed on the personal inventory 
items, which the court apparently did not consider in its ruling. 
Plaintiff responded that Mr. King was not simply designated as a rebuttal 
witness to Mr. Freeman, but as part of Plaintiff s case in chief. (Rec. 1198) Mr. King 
didn't prepare his report in rebuttal to Mr. Freeman's report, but in response to Mr. 
Lyman's findings and report.(Rec. 1198). Mr. King submitted his report long before Mr 
Freeman was designated as a fire expert for the Defendant and before Mr. Freeman's 
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report was submitted. (Rec. 63-73). Plaintiff also argued, as far as "accidental" cause, 
that the burden of proving arson in order to deny payment under the Policy, is on the 
Insurance Company. (Rec. 1198). Plaintiff further argued that a directed verdict was 
inappropriate because numerous issues of fact were presented to the jury, regarding the 
cause of the fire, an J the jury could still determine, based on the facts presented, that the 
Plaintiff did not start the fire. (Rec. 1199). Plaintiff reminded the Judge of his ruling on 
summary judgment where he had earlier found such issues of fact for the jury to decide. 
(Rec. 1199) Plaintiff also argued that the denial under the Policy required more that just a 
determination as to whether the fire was "accidental," but whether it was set by the 
insured. For instance, even if the jury found that the fire wasn't "accidental," the jury 
could still find that the Plaintiff was entitled to payment under the Policy, if it believed 
that she did not directly cause, or arrange, the fire. (Rec. 1199). 
The court granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, indicating that 
it was a breach of contract case under the Policy and the Insurance Company refused to 
pay because it had determined that the fire was intentionally set, and in all likelihood, by 
her or at her direction.4 (Rec. 1200). The court continued, stating that the burden is on the 
Plaintiff, as the insured, to establish that the fire was "accidental" and not intentionally 
4The court at this point is apparently weighing and determining the factual issues. 
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set; and that the Plaintiff must at least present evidence that the fire was not intentionally 
set, which the Plaintiff has not done, by resting without presenting expert testimony with 
regard to cause and origin. (Rec. 1200). Thereafter, the court dismissed the matter based 
upon Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec. 1201). 
A Judgment for Directed Verdict was entered on December 21, 2006. 
Plaintiff objected to the form of the Order because at trial, the Judge dismissed the case, 
not based on Rule 50(a), but based on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Rec. 1188). A Motion for New Trial was filed on January 2, 2007, pursuant to Rule 
59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was considered by newly appointed 
Judge, Kate A. Toomey. (Rec. 1226-1232). The Motion for New Trial was denied by 
way of Minute Entry entered by Judge Toomey on February 28, 2007. (Rec. 1291-1293). 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 29, 2007. (Rec. 1296). 
Statement of Facts: 
1. Appellant, Leigh Young aka Hardy ("Leigh") owned a home located 
at 9950 Marble Street, Sandy Utah, which suffered fire damage on the morning of July 
26,2001. The fire started at 6:45 a.m., when no one was home. (Rec.1304, pg. 17) 
2. Leigh had fire insurance on her home, Policy No. 76-06092-23-87 
from Appellee, Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Insurance Company"), which was in effect 
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on the day of the fire. (Rec. 1304, pg. 22-23). 
3. When the fire occurred the mortgage payments were current on the 
home and the insurance premiums paid. It was admitted by the Insurance Company at 
trial, that all terms and conditions of the Policy were met as far as Plaintiffs entitlement 
to coverage under the Policy. This was an admitted fact at trial, as stipulated to by the 
Defendant; and ruled by the court. (Rec. 1304, pg. 23). 
4. At the time of the fire, the mortgage balance was $45,4656.96, and 
Leigh's ex-husband had recently quit-claimed his interest in the home to Leigh. The 
monthly payments were $696.00 and the home had an assessed tax value of $134,300.00. 
Leigh had substantial equity in the home and owned the title free and clear if she wanted 
to sell the home. (Rec. 22-23, Trial Ex. 4). 
5. In July of 2001, Leigh resided in the home with her daughter Breigh 
Hardy, who was 14 at the time. Leigh's son Tim Hardy, who was 16 at the time, was 
living with his father, Brad Hardy (Leigh's ex-husband) in Idaho. (Rec. 1304, pg. 72). 
6. On the morning of July 26, 2001, when the fire started, no one was at 
the house. Leigh had spent the mght of July 25, 2001, at the Travel Lodge in downtown 
Salt Lake City, with her new husband Doug Young. Breigh had recently left with her 
father, Brad Hardy, to visit him in Idaho. In exchange Leigh's son, Tim Hardy, was left 
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here in Utah to stay with friends. (Rec. 1304, pg. 26, 72). 
7. The last time Leigh was in the home, before the fire, was the night of 
July 24th or the early morning of July 25th 2001. She did not notice anything strange or 
unusual at the house at this time. (Rec. 1304, pg. 25) Leigh was in the process of 
remodeling her house, repairing the walls, getting new floors (Rec. 1304, pg. 34) and had 
furniture and other items stacked in the rooms. (Rec. 1305, pgs.168-169). 
8. The fire started at 6:45 a.m. July 26, 2001. Leigh first learned of the 
fire while at the Travel Lodge in Salt Lake City. Leigh returned home to find firefighters 
in her house. The home was severely damaged and Leigh's personal belongings were 
scattered all over the lawn. (Rec. 1304, pg. 35 & 36). 
9. Unbeknownst to Leigh at the time, her son Tim was in the home the 
night of the fire with several friends. Tim and his friends were in the room where the fire 
started, using a number of electrical appliances, which were located in the middle of the 
room on a large pine table; including a TV, a VCR, and a video game station. (Rec. 1305, 
pg. 137-141). Tim and his friends were lying on two mattresses in the room watching 
TV, playing video games, and just hanging out. They were drinking alcohol, and 
smoking both cigarets and marijuana, while laying on two separate mattresses, one on the 
floor and one on the bed. (Rec. 1305, pg 139). They also lit 4 or 5 candles in the room, 
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including one on the TV located on the pine table in the middle of the room. (Rec. 1305, 
pgs. 137-155). 
10. Tim and his friends were at the home until approximately 2:00 a.m. 
the morning of July 26, 2001. Chad Smith, one of Tim's friends who was there, drove 
over in a Ford Ranger pickup truck that looked a lot like the truck Doug Young drove. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 146 & 152). 
11. Upon returning home, after learning of the fire, Leigh was 
overwhelmed by the damage to her home and to her personal property. She eventually 
hired Adjusters International (a professional adjusting company) to assess her loss, 
prepare inventory lists, and to submit the necessary forms to her Insurance Company. 
(Rec. 1304, pg. 41-43). 
12. Adjusters International on behalf of Leigh, prepared and submitted 
claims to the Insurance Company, first for living expenses, and then Proof of Loss forms 
for the dwelling and personal property, as required under the Policy. These were forms 
were submitted in October of 2001. (Rec. 1304, pg. 41-43; Trial Exs. 1042). 
13. The Insurance Company began paying the living expenses, then 
approximately 6 months later, in a letter dated January 31, 2002, the Insurance Company 
claimed an exclusion under the Intentional Acts provision of the Policy which provides: 
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"If any insured directly causes or arranges for a loss to covered property in order to 
obtain insurance benefits, this policy is void." No claim was made by the Insurance 
Company that the Policy was not in effect on the day of the fire, or that the fire was not a 
covered catastrophe under the Policy. Rather, the Insurance Company asserted arson 
under the Policy's exclusions. (Rec. 1304, pgs. 51-52: Trial Ex. 16, denial letter). 
14. Leigh did not set fire to her home, nor did she arrange for anyone 
else to set fire to her home. She did not know of the fire until she was called at the Travel 
Lodge by her son's girlfriend, Kelly, at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 a.m., that morning. 
(Rec. 1304, pgs. 35-36).. Leigh testified that she was surprised by the fire and did not 
know how the fire started and asked investigators "how the fire started?" but received no 
response. (Rec. 1304, pg. 38). Leigh has maintained her innocense throughout.5 
15. Leigh cooperated with the Insurance Company and its investigators, 
but the Insurance Company still refused to pay, although there was no evidence linking 
Leigh to the fire. Leigh filed this action alleging breach of contract, under the insurance 
Policy, as well as, bad faith on the part of the Insurance Company. (Rec. 1-6). 
16. Sandy City Fire Marshall, Richard Lyman, reported that he believed 
the point of origin was in some debris in the middle of the downstairs bedroom. (Rec. 
5The criminal action filed against Leigh, was dismissed at the Preliminary Hearing 
stage by Judge Ann Boyden. 
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1305, pg. 209) There was no concrete evidence based on the bum oatterns, but he 
believed it was a flashover fire, where the heat slowly builds up so everything ignites at 
the same time. (Rec. 1305, pg. 215 & 229). The sagging in the mattress springs indicated 
that there was more heat in that area of the room, but he did not find any ignition source 
for the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg.218 & 219) He believed the debris lui on by the accelerant 
dog, was a transmission part, then later believed it to be a computer or television part. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 228) Mr. Lyman had no evidence that Leigh was involved in the cause of 
the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 222). 
17. Under the National Fire Protection Agency ("NFPA1") Guidelines, a 
fire is not to be determined as intentionally set, until all possible accidental sources have 
been eliminated. (Rec. 1305, pg. 223). Mr. Lyman failed to check all the outlets and 
electrical appliances in the room. (Rec. 1305, pg. 224-229). There was a lot of heat 
produced in the mattresses that could have caused the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 224). The 
debris the dog hit on, could have been pulled down from the ceiling; and it could be a 
transmission part, an automobile part, a computer or television part. He did not have the 
part at trial, and did not know what it was. (Rec. 1305, pg. 228). Mr. Lyman later learned 
that Tim Hardy, Brandon Yates, and their friends were in the home the night of the fire, 
but he did not talk to them, or consider their information, in preparing his report. (Rec. 
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1305, pg. 231). He testified that this information would be important to a fire 
investigator; and that his report could change with new information. (Rec. 1305, pg. 232). 
18. Leigh obtained her own fire expert, Mr. Fred King, who was of the 
opinion that the earlier investigation failed to properly eliminate any and all accidental 
sources for the fire to be considered intentional under NFPA Guidelines. (Rec. 68) Mr 
King opined that the fire, was a flashover fire, and that the heat build up of this nature, 
and the sag in the mattress springs, was a "classic indication of a mattress fire" or a fire 
originating in overstuffed furniture. (Rec. 68). He also found that there was a likely 
cross contamination of the debris hit on by the accelerant dog. (Rec.68). 
19. According to the fire marshall, the condition of the home had 
nothing to do with the cause of the fire and was not a factor in the fire. (Rec. 1305, pg. 
224). Mr. Weinheimer only saw inside the house for five minutes through a screen door. 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 195) He did not have authority to condemn the house and never told 
Leigh that he would close the home to occupancy, but eluded that possibility. (Rec. 1305, 
pg. 196-197). If a home is closed to occupancy, the owner can still go into the home to 
remodel and make repairs. This is encouraged to fix any problems. (Rec. 1305, pg. 196). 
20. The dog handler, Rex Nelson, in his report indicated that he had the 
mattress springs removed before he went in with his dog (Rec. 1305, 241) and that the 
dog hit was in the northeast area of the room, not the middle of the room (Rec. 1305, pg. 
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46). He indicated that his report may be off because he wasn't sure which way the home 
faced. (Rec. 1305, pg. 247). He did not personally bring the debris or other samples out 
to test them; and when they were brought out they were placed on a plywood board. He 
did not preserve the part hit on, to determine what it was. (Rec. 1305, pg. 247-249). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court pushed and effectively cut an eight day jury trial down to two 
days. This prejudiced both parties, and prevented the Plaintiff the opportunity to present 
all of the evidence in her case.6 The court, well aware that Plaintiff had a fire expert 
scheduled to testify as to the cause and origin of the fire (whose appearance had been 
moved up several days at the court's request) erred in dismissing the case by directed 
verdict, before the close of Plaintiff s evidence. 
Furthermore, on a motion for directed verdict involving a jury trial, the 
moving party must show that no issues of fact were presented in the case for the jury to 
decide. In this case, numerous issues of fact were presented for the jury to decide 
regarding the cause and origin of the fire. Including the testimony of the insured, Leigh, 
that she didn't start the fire, as well as Tim Hardy and Brandon Yates, who were both in 
the room where the fire started, a few hours earlier, with friends drinking, smoking and 
6The court indicated that the case would end on the third day of trial, no matter 
what. This prejudiced both parties, by not allowing Plaintiffs fire expert to testify on 
Thursday, or Defendant's expert, Mr. Freeman, to testify on Friday. 
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lighting candles on several mattresses. The Sandy Fire Marshall indicated that it was a 
flashover fire, and could have been a mattress fire. He could not determine the source of 
ignition, but never talked to the boys that were in the home that night, although he 
indicated that this information would be important and could change his report. He did 
not have the part hit on, didn't know what it was, and didn't have any lab results 
regarding the part. Rex Nelson contradicted the location where the fire started, saying it 
started in the northeast area of the room. He did not personally handle the debris or part 
hit on, and failed to preserve any evidence for trial. The investigator Scott Bebee claimed 
that Leigh told him she was at the home the night of the 25th instead of the 24th. He also 
testified as to Leigh's financial condition, and the results of his background check on 
Leigh, to raise a possible financial motive for starting the fire. Mr. Weinheimer testified 
regarding the condition of the home and the possibility of it being closed to occupancy. 
This evidence presents numerous issues of fact for the jury to decide regarding not only 
the cause of the fire, but the involvement and possible motive of the insured to start the 
fire, precluding a directed verdict. 
The court indicated that no evidence regarding the cause of the fire was 
presented because Plaintiff had not called her expert witness. However, expert testimony 
is not necessary for a party to put on evidence and present issues of fact for a jury to 
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decide regarding the cause of a fire. Furthermore, expert testimony was not needed in this 
case for the Plaintiff to present issues of fact for the jury to decide regarding the cause of 
the fire in her home, and particularly her involvement, or lack thereof, in the fire. 
Moreover, the question as to whether Plaintiff was entitled to payment for 
her fire damage under the Policy, i.e., her prima facie case, was an admitted fact at trial. 
This was agreed and stipulated to by the Defendant at trial and ruled as an admitted fact 
by the court. This was not the issue being tried to the jury. The issue being tried was 
whether or not the Plaintiff intentionally set or arranged the fire, thereby falling under the 
Policy's Intentional Act Exclusion, relied on by the Insurance Company in refusing 
payment. (Trial Ex. 16). Once the Insurance Company admitted that the Plaintiff was 
otherwise entitled to coverage under the Policy, the burden shifted to the Insurance 
Company to prove arson as its affirmative defense. The burden is not on the insured to 
prove disprove arson, i.e. that the fire was "accidental." Furthermore, under the Policy at 
issue in this case (for Plaintiffs breach of contract claim) the determinative issue is not 
whether or not the fire was "accidental;" but rather, whether Leigh, as the insured, 
directly caused, or arranged the fire.7 
7Even if the jury found the fire was not "accidental," the jury could still find that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to payment under the Policy, if it believed that the Plaintiff, 
herself, did not directly cause or arrange for the fire. 
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In addition, when all of Plaintiff s witnesses were not available to testify, 
including her expert, the Insurance Company (without objection or making a motion to 
dismiss on the evidence then presented) elected to proceed with its own evidence and 
witnesses, including Mr. Lyman who testified as a fire expert regarding the cause and 
origin of the fire.8 Therefore, even if Mr. King was only a rebuttal witness, Plaintiff was 
still entitled to put him on as a rebuttal witness to Mr. Lyman's testimony. Mr. King's 
report was submitted in response to Mr. Lyman's investigation and before, Mr. Freeman 
was even designated as a witness or filed his report. 
Plus, as stated above, even without the testimony of Mr. King as a fire 
expert, the testimony of the other witnesses, on direct and cross-examination, easily raises 
issues of fact regarding the cause and origin of the fire, the possible motivation of the 
insured to set or arrange the fire, and the insured's actual involvement in the start of the 
fire, for the jury to decide. All these facts and inferences on Defendant's Motion for 
Directed Verdict, must be viewed in favor of the Plaintiff. Numerous issues of fact were 
presented to the jury regarding the cause of the fire and Leigh's involvement in the fire; 
therefore, the Motion for Directed Verdict should have been denied. 
8The Insurance Company cannot complain, as it argued later, that Mr. King should 
have testified earlier, when it had no objection to proceeding with its own witnesses and 
fire expert, out of turn, while waiting for Mr. King to arrive from out of town, tcrtestify. 
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Finally, the court indicated that it was dismissing the matter pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) does not apply to jury trials 
The court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) usurped the jury of its exclusive fact finding 
prerogative; and such dismissal based on Rule 41(b) should not be allowed to stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
BAD FAITH CLAIM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHEN MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WERE PRESENT. 
The determination as to whether there is a "fairly debatable" defense under 
the facts and circumstances is usually a question of law. Billings v. Union Bankers Inc. 
Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). However, when there are factual questions as to 
coverage, this is a question for the jury to decide. Billings v. Union Bankers Inc. Co., 918 
P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996). 
In this case there were numerous factual questions presented on the motions 
for summary judgment that should have been left for a jury to decide, regarding the 
actions of the Insurance Company, its investigation, and its denial based on arson. For 
example, the insurance investigator, Mr. Bebee testified he though the fire was 
intentionally set because no one was home at the time and that neighbors going to work in 
the morning reported the fire. He also did not talk to the boys who were in the home that 
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night. This is not a sufficient investigation to deny coverage, and a jury could find that 
this constituted bad faith on the part of the Insurance Company. At a minimum, this 
matter should not have been dismissed as a matter of law, but should have been left for 
the jury to decide. Id. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY WHEN HE WAS 
PROPERLY DESIGNATED AND SCHEDULED TO APPEAR 
A party has a right to call witnesses, including expert witnesses to testify on 
its behalf at trial. The trial court's refusal to allow Plaintiffs expert, Mr. Fred King, to 
testify as scheduled, and then dismissing Plaintiffs case, due to Plaintiffs failure to 
provide expert testimony regarding the cause of the fire, was an abuse of discretion, and 
was substantially prejudicial to the Plaintiff. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1994). The court asked the Plaintiff several time, if Plaintiff rests, and the Plaintiff 
explained each time that her expert was coming from Colorado to testify. In fact, at the 
court's request, Mr. King was contacted during a noon recess, and his appearance was 
moved up to Thursday at noon. (This was only the third day of a scheduled eight day jury 
trial.) The court indicated to Plaintiff and stated on the record that Thursday at noon 
would be acceptable to the court; that Mr. King would be heard Thursday at noon, the 
case argued and then sent to the jury. (Rec. 1305, pg. 252-253). 
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Under Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing motions 
for directed verdicts, it requires that the motion for directed verdict not be made until "at 
the close of evidence offered by an opponent." The court in this case erred in granting the 
Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict before the close of Plaintiff s evidence. The 
court knew that Plaintiffs expert was to testify at noon that same day, and had previously 
indicated to the Plaintiff that this would be acceptable. The Defendant also knew that 
Plaintiffs expert was scheduled to testify and that Plaintiff had not reached the close of 
her evidence. In fact, the Defendant asked the court if the Plaintiff had rested, and the 
court indicated "of course he hasn't. Because he hasn't got all of his witnesses here." 
(Rec. 1305, pg. 253). 
The trial court erred when it refused to allow all of Plaintiff s witnesses, 
including her expert to testify, when the court knew that he was properly designated and 
he was scheduled to appear to testify on her behalf that same day; as the court had 
previously approved on the record. Furthermore, the court knew that Plaintiff had not 
rested, because all of Plaintiff s witnesses had not testified. 
39 
III. THE BURDEN IS ON THE INSURANCE COMPANY 
TO PROVE ARSON AS ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
The issuance of an insurance policy for the loss, and the receipt of 
premiums on the policy, establishes the prima facie liability of the insurance company. 
Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 453 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah 1969); Peterson v. Western 
Casualty and Surety Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1967). In this case, Plaintiff testified that 
she had a fire insurance Policy on her home, that she had made all the premium payments, 
and that the fire was a covered catastrophe under the Policy, thus entitling her to payment 
for her fire damage under the Policy. This was admitted by the Insurance Company, and 
recognized by the court as an admitted fact. (Rec. 1304, pg. 23). Plaintiff made & prima 
facie case for wrongful denial; and this was not even an issue being tired in the case. The 
issue being tried was whether or not Plaintiff intentionally set or arranged the fire in order 
to justify the Insurance Company's refusal to pay, relying on the Policy's exclusions, as 
set forth in the Insurance Company's denial letter, dated January 31, 2002, and admitted 
into evidence. (Trial Exhibit 16). 
Therefore, Plaintiff did met her prima facie case to show her entitlement to 
recover under the Policy; and the burden was on the Insurance Company to prove arson as 
its affirmative defense. In Horrell vs Utah Farm Bureau Inc. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Utah 
App. 1996) this Court held that the burden of proving arson is on the insurance company 
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and not the insured. In this case, the trial court by requiring the Plaintiff to disprove arson, 
i.e., that the fire was "accidental", improperly placed the burden of proving arson on the 
insured. Id. 
Furthermore, there is only an exclusion if the fire is intentionally set or 
arranged by the insured. Therefore, whether the fire was "accidental" is not determinative 
as to Plaintiffs recovery under the Policy; and thus, it is not necessary to prove the fire 
was "accidental" to establish a prima facie case for recovery under the Policy. In other 
words, the jury could have found that the fire was not "accidental" based on the testimony 
at trial, but still could have awarded Plaintiff her recovery under the insurance Policy, if 
the jury believed that she did not intentionally set or arrange for the fire in her home. The 
trial court's ruling that the Plaintiff had the burden to show the fire was "accidental" to 
recover under the Policy, was clearly an error in the law. 
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR 
AN INSURED TO RAISE ISSUES OF FACT AS TO 
THE CAUSE OF A FIRE FOR THE JURY. 
Even if the trial court properly excluded Plaintiffs expert from testifying, 
expert testimony is not necessary to put on evidence to create an issue of fact for a jury to 
determine whether or not a fire was accidental. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 
2006 P.3d (2006 Ut. App. 500). Even if one party does elect to put on expert testimony 
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that a fire was intentionally set; the opposing party is still not required to put on expert 
testimony that the fire was accidental, in order to raise issues of fact for the jury. Id. See 
also Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Ut.App. 2002) (failure to have expert testimony 
regarding causation does not establish causation as a matter of law, so as to allow a 
directed verdict against a party). Furthermore, in determining the cause of a fire, a jury 
may elect to give no weight at all to an expert's testimony. See Dixon v. Stewart, 658 
P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982). 
Therefore, the Plaintiff was not required to put on expert testimony that the 
fire was "accidental" in order to present an issue of fact to the jury regarding the cause 
and origin of the fire. The jury could have totally disregarded the testimony of Mr. 
Lyman regarding the origin of the fire, or could have given very little weight to his belief 
that the fire was intentionally set, since he based his finding on no other legitimate 
ignition source being known, when he did not talk to the boys in preparing his report, 
although he believed their information would be important, and could change the findings 
in his report. Certainly the Plaintiff would not be required to put on expert testimony 
regarding her lack of any financial motivation to set her home on fire; and her lack of any 
involvement in the fire. The court erred in ruling that the lack of expert testimony 
prevented the jury from considering the above factual issues. 
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V. WHEN THE DEFENDANT ELECTS TO PUT ON 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE; THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO PUT 
ON EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL. 
Where a Defendant is allowed to introduce evidence of an affirmative 
defense, the Plaintiff, as a matter of right; is entitled to introduce evidence in rebuttal to 
such affirmative evidence. Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Ut.App.1998). In this case, 
after Plaintiff had no more witnesses available to testify, the Defendant, without 
objection, elected to proceeded with its own evidence regarding its affirmative defense of 
arson. This was done voluntarily, knowing that the Plaintiff had not finished with her 
witnesses, and specifically that Plaintiff still intended to call her fire expert, Mr. King. 
Therefore, since the Defendant elected to put on a fire expert, Mr. Lyman, 
to testify that the fire was intentionally set, and Mr. Nelson, the dog handler regarding his 
investigation of the fire, before moving for directed verdict; the Plaintiff had the right to 
put on Mr. King in rebuttal to this testimony (even if Mr. King was only listed as a 
rebuttal witness); and the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. King to testify in rebuttal to 
the testimony of Mr. Lyman and Mr. Nelson. Id. at 1087 
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VI. WHEN A DEFENDANT ELECTS TO PROCEED WITH 
ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BEFORE SEEKING A 
DIRECTED VERDICT IT WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO RELY 
SOLELY ON EVIDENCE IN PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED 
CASE IN CHIEF AND ALL EVIDENCE OFFERED IS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION. 
When a Defendant proceeds to put on evidence in support of its defense or 
justification after the Plaintiffs evidence rather than seeking a directed verdict; the 
defendant waives his right for a directed verdict based solely on the evidence in plaintiffs 
alleged case in chief, and all evidence offered is available for the jury's consideration. 
State v. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 (Utah 1957). 
Since the Defendant in this case elected to proceed with its case and put on 
evidence of its affirmative defense of arson, without objection; and before seeking a 
directed verdict, all evidence offered is available for the jury's consideration. Id. 
Therefore, with all the above evidence being presented in the case, sufficient issues of 
fact were presented to the jury regarding the cause of the fire, Plaintiffs financial 
situation and possible motivation to set the fire, and her direct involvement in the fire. 
For instance, Plaintiff testified that she was not at all involved in the start of 
the fire. The Sandy Fire Marshall, Mr. Lyman, testified that he thought the fire was 
intentionally set. Tim Hardy and Brandon Yates, testified that they were in the home that 
night drinking, lighting candles, and smoking cigarets and marijuana on two mattresses. 
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Mr. Lyman, indicated that the fire was a flashover fire and could have started in one of 
the mattresses. He admitted that the information from the boys would have been 
important to his report, but that he did not talk to them. He also indicated that new 
information could change his report and his conclusion that the fire was intentionally set. 
Leigh testified that she was not there the night of the fire. The insurance investigator 
Scott Bebee testified that Leigh told him that she was there the night of the fire between 
1:30 and 2:00 a.m., rather than the night before the fire; and he also testified as to the 
background check he did into Leigh's court records and financial situation as a possible 
motive for setting the fire. Mr. Weinheimer also testified as to the condition of the house, 
which was countered by the testimony of Mr. Lyman that the condition of the house had 
nothing to do with the fire; and the possibility of closing the home to occupancy, which 
was countered on his cross-examination, and by Leigh's testimony. 
Basically all of the witnesses testified in this trial, except for Plaintiffs fire 
expert and Defendant's second fire expert, Mr. Freeman. All of the evidence offered by 
these witnesses, including the exhibits admitted into evidence at trial, are available for the 
jury's consideration in this case. All of this evidence is more than sufficient to raise an 
issue of fact regarding the cause of the fire and Plaintiffs involvement, or lack thereof, in 
the fire, to preclude a directed verdict for the Defendant. 
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VII. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO 
RAISE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT FOR THE JURY 
TO DECIDE, PRECLUDING A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
On a motion for directed verdict the moving party has the very difficult 
burden of showing that the party with the burden of proof has failed to raise any questions 
of material fact, and the court should deny the motion when any evidence exists raising 
such a question, "no matter how improbable the evidence may appear." Alta Health 
Strategies, Inc., v. CCIMechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 284 (Ut.App. 1996)(emphasis added). 
On a motion for directed verdict the court is not to weigh the evidence or 
determine its probability, but it is only to determine if some evidence exists to create a 
material issue of fact.9 Id. 
Given all the evidence presented in this case regarding the cause of the fire, 
Plaintiffs involvement in the fire, or lack thereof, a possible motive to set the fire, as well 
as, the alleged unexplained circumstances regarding the fire, as set forth above; numerous 
issues of material fact were presented for the jury to decide, precluding a directed verdict 
for the Defendant. 
9The court in its ruling on directed verdict does not address the evidence that was 
presented by the witnesses, the documents admitted into evidence, or if the court even 
considered such evidence. (Rec. 1200-1201). 
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BEFORE THE 
CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for 
directed verdict may be made at the close of the opposing party's evidence. It was known 
to the Defendant and the court, that Plaintiff still intended to call its expert Mr. King, to 
testify regarding the cause and origin of the fire. Mr. King was scheduled to testify 
Thursday at noon, which was acceptable to the court, as stated on the record. The trial 
court erred and greatly prejudiced the Plaintiff in ruling that Plaintiffs expert would be 
able to testify at noon on Thursday, and then granting Defendant's Motion for Directed 
Verdict on Thursday morning, before the close of Plaintiff s evidence. 
The Defendant also waived any right to claim that Mr. King should not be 
allowed to testify. The Defendant waived this right, because when Mr. King was not 
originally available to testify with Plaintiffs other witnesses, the Defendant agreed to call 
its own witnesses and proceed with its defense, out of turn, and before Mr. King would be 
available to testify. If the Defendant had an objection to proceeding in such a manner, it 
should have raised such objection at the time. Rather, the Defendant indicated that it had 
no objection to proceeding with its witnesses and allowing Mr. King to testify later. 
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The court specifically asked if the Plaintiff rests, to which Plaintiff replied 
that she still had her fire expert, Mr. King, coming from out of state to testify on Friday. 
The court requested that he be contacted to move this time up, which he was, and he was 
scheduled to appear Thursday at noon. The court indicated to the Plaintiff that this would 
be satisfactory, and that the case would proceed, with Mr. King testifying at noon on 
Thursday. The court never indicated that Mr. King had to be there earlier to testify, or that 
the case would be dismissed without his testimony. (This was only the second day of a 
eight day trial). The court should have allowed Mr. King to testify and the Plaintiff to 
complete her evidence, before ruling on Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b) WHICH DOES NOT APPLY 
TO JURY TRIALS, BUT TO BENCH TRIALS. 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs case in the middle of a jury trial, relying 
on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) URCP applies only to 
bench trials, not jury trials. Rule 41(b) should not be used injury trials and should not be 
confused with a motion for directed verdict. Grossen v. DeWitt, 982 P.2d 581 (Ut.App. 
1999). Under Rule 41(b) the trial court may not usurp the jury's fact-finding role. Id. 
The court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs jury trial, based on Rule 41(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, the Directed Verdict must be set aside. 
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CONCLUSION 
An issue of fact remained regarding the Insurance Company's investigation 
of the fire and whether it was conducted in good faith. The bad faith claim should have 
remained for the jury to decide at trial. 
Sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to raise issues of fact for the jury 
to decide regarding the cause of the fire, as well as, Plaintiffs involvement, or lack 
thereof, in the fire. Considering that such evidence exists, which is all that is necessary to 
overcome a motion for directed verdict; the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's 
Motion for Directed Verdict. 
Furthermore, expert testimony was not required to present issues of fact for 
the jury to consider, in determining the cause and origin of the fire, and certainly not as to 
the Plaintiffs alleged motivation and involvement, or lack thereof, in the start of the fire. 
Plaintiff did put on evidence and did establish a prima facie case for breach 
of the Insurance Policy, i.e. that the Policy was in effect and premiums paid, which the 
Insurance Company stipulated to at trial, and the court ruled as an admitted fact. This 
was sufficient to place the burden of proving arson on the Insurance Company. It is not 
the insured's burden to disprove arson, i.e, that the fire was "accidental," to recover for 
breach of the Insurance Policy; and the trial court erred in placing this burden on the 
Plaintiff when considering the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict. 
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Moreover, the trial court erred when it did not allow Plaintiffs expert to 
testify in rebuttal to Defendant's expert witnesses, which Defendant elected to put on, 
without objection or moving for a directed verdict on the evidence then presented. The 
trial court erred by not allowing Plaintiffs expert to testify when the court previously 
ruled that Plaintiffs expert would be able to testify at noon on Thursday, before Plaintiff 
rested her case. The court erred when it granted Defendant's Motion for Directed 
Verdict, Thursday morning, when both the court and Defendant knew that Plaintiffs 
expert was coming to testify later that day and Plaintiff had not rested her case. 
In addition, the court failed to consider all of the evidence presented, 
including Plaintiff and her witnesses, Defendant's witnesses, and all the reports, and other 
documents admitted into evidence, in determining if issues of fact were present. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it dismissed the case in the middle of a 
jury trial, based on Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) does not 
apply to jury trials, and its application took away the jury's fact finding prerogative. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Directed Verdict should be set aside; and the 
case remanded back for a jury trial on the issues. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of June, 2007. 
BOND & CALL L.C. 
BWtfW.Cafl 
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I hereby certify that on the jj> day of June 20071 did mail, postage 
prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT, to the following: 
Barbara Maw 
515 East 100 South, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Minute Entry on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, 
dated August 7,2006. (Rec. 935-941) 
B. Judgment on Directed Verdict, entered December 21, 2006. 
(Rec. 1209-1210). 
C. Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). (Rec. 1226-1228). 
D. Minute Entry denying Motion for New Trial, February 28,2007. 
(Rec. 1291-1294). 
E. Notice of Appeal, filed March 29, 2007. (Rec. 1296-1297). 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DrSW5CT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEIGH YOUNG, 
vs . 
FIRE INSURANCE 
Plaintiff, 
EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 040915146 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
August 7, 2006 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument 
with respect to the motions on July 7, 2007. Following the 
hearing, the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
On July 26, 2001, at approximately 6:45 a.m., a fire occurred 
at Plaintiff's residence on 950 South Marble Street in Sandy, Utah. 
Plaintiff was not home at the time of the fire. On the date of the 
fire, Plaintiff had fire insurance coverage with Defendant. 
Defendant initially made payments under the policy. However, 
approximately six months after the fire, Defendant refused to make 
any further payments, claiming no further obligation under Section 
I - CONDITIONS paragraph 11, Intentional Acts. Defendant claimed 
the fire was intentionally caused or arranged by the Plaintiff in 
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order to obtain insurance benefits. Defendant also refused to 
proceed under the policy based on the GENERAL CONDITIONS, claiming 
that the insured willfully concealed or misrepresented information 
relating to the circumstances surrounding the fire. 
In support of its motion, Defendant argues that under the 
circumstances of this case, Plaintiff's entitlement to any benefits 
under the insurance policy is "fairly debatable." Consequently, 
contends Defendant, it cannot be liable for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law. 
Further, argues Defendant, it is undisputed Plaintiff's bad faith 
claim is a first-party or contract claim, and that Plaintiff has 
not asserted an independent tort. As such, asserts Defendant, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law. 
Specifically, argues Defendant, the information it possessed, 
as a matter of law, created factual issues as to the claim's 
validity. This information, asserts Defendant, includes: (1) the 
opinions of two cause and origin experts that the fire was 
intentionally set; (2) an admission by Plaintiff to Defendant that 
she was at the scene the morning of the fire, corroborated by a 
neighbor who placed her and her husband's vehicle at the scene that 
morning; (3) conveniently, nobody was staying at the home at the 
time of the fire; (4) the dogs that were normally kept in the 
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garage were outside in the kennel; (5) the unhabitable condition of 
the home such that, in all probability, it would have been 
condemned and her daughter would be taken into protective custody; 
(6) the lack of finances to remedy the condition of the home; (7) 
the failure to meet with the representative of the Board of Health 
after many attempts until the morning of the fire; (8) the presence 
of an accelerant; and (9) financial difficulties, including many 
judgments and tax liens. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion and brings her own motion for 
summary judgment arguing the allegations of Defendant do not 
present a factual issue as to the validity of Plaintiff's claim and 
there is no arguable reason from these alleged facts that the 
insured would set fire to her home. According to Plaintiff, she 
had substantial equity in her home that had recently been 
quit-claimed to her by her ex-husband. Moreover, asserts 
Plaintiff, her ex-husband was to continue the mortgage payments in 
lieu of his court-ordered support obligations. It is Plaintiff's 
position there was no financial reason for her to set fire to the 
home. 
Additionally, contends Plaintiff, there is no evidence that 
she had any opportunity that morning to set the fire and all the 
evidence indicates that she was not home when the fire started. 
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Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, there is also no evidence that she had 
any information or knowledge on how to commit arson. 
Further, argues Plaintiff, there is no evidence that her 
daughter was to be taken into protective custody and, in fact, her 
daughter was in Idaho with her father at the time. 
According to Plaintiff, setting fire to the home would not 
remedy any decision to take her daughter into protective custody, 
nor would it remedy any chance that the home might be closed to 
occupancy. Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, such would guaranty the 
home!s closure. 
With regard to punitive damages, Plaintiff claims she has 
alleged a claim independent from the Breach of Contract claim for 
Bad Faith in the Defendant's conduct and actions in this case and 
a claim independent of the contract for breach of duties beyond the 
contract is recognized in Utah. 
In sum, it is Plaintiff's position that sufficient facts have 
not been raised which create an issue of fact that Plaintiff 
intentionally set or arranged the fire. Indeed, argues Plaintiff, 
the cause of the fire remains unknown and based upon the facts of 
this case, a jury would be left to decide the matter based upon 
speculation and conjecture. Further, asserts Plaintiff, no facts 
have been discovered that Plaintiff intentionally misrepresented 
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the facts, known to her, sufficient to void the insurance policy 
under Utah law. 
Turning, initially, to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, under Utah law, where a claim is "fairly debatable," the 
insurer acts reasonably in denying that claim and cannot be found 
to have acted in bad faith. A claim is "fairly debatable" "[if] 
the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's 
validity." Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 
(Utah 2002) . After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court 
finds the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the 
claim's validity and, consequently, there exists a debatable reason 
for denial, thus eliminating the bad faith claim. See Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
As to Plaintiff's cross motion, to establish a prima facie 
case of arson for purposes of denying coverage under an insurance 
policy, the insurer must show: (1) that the fire was incendiary in 
nature, (2) the insured had a financial motive for setting the 
fire, and (3) unexplained surrounding circumstantial evidence 
implicated the suspect. See Lawson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. 
Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 318 (Colo. App. 1978). In the instant case, 
disputed issues of fact surrounding these elements preclude summary 
judgment as requested by Plaintiff. 
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Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment is, respectfully, denied. 
/-SE-DATED this jSj_ day of August, 2 0 06. 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040915146 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BUDGE W CALL 
ATTORNEY PLA 
8 EAST BROADWAY 
SUITE 72 0 
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Mail BARBARA L MAW 
ATTORNEY DEF 
515 EAST 10 0 SOUTH 
SUITE 52 5 
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Dated this % ^ day of A.\)flU \ 20 0(p . 
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ADDENDUM B 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
BARBARA L. MAW #4081 
Law Offices of Barbara L. Maw, P.C. 
515 East 100 South, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-9700 
Fax: (801)533-8111 
Attorney for Defendant 
DEC 2 1 OJU 
SALILAKE COUNTY 
By. Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEIGH YOUNG, aka HARDY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Case No. 040915146 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The trial of the above-entitled matter was held on November 28, 29 and 30, 2006, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding before an 8-person jury. 
Plaintiff Leigh Hardy Young was present and represented by counsel, Budge Call of the 
law firm of Bond & Call. Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange was present and represented by 
counsel, Barbara L. Maw of the law firm of Barbara L. Maw, P.C. 
The parties presented opening statements. Plaintiff put on evidence by way of witnesses, 
documents and exhibits. Defendant also put on evidence byway of witnesses, documents and 
exhibits. At the conclusion of Plaintiff s case, Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange made a 
Motion for Directed Verdict pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a). The Court 
granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, finding that Plaintiff had the burden of proving 
entitlement to insurance coverage or that Fire Insurance Exchange breached the contract of 
insurance. Having failed to put on any evidence to support her position that Fire Insurance 
Exchange breached the contract by showing the fire was accidentally set (reserving her cause and 
origin expert for rebuttal), Plaintiff failed to establish that her claim for benefits was wrongfully 
denied or that Fire Insurance Exchange breached the insurance contract. 
Pursuant to all of the foregoing, and good cause appearing, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be and the 
same is hereby entered as follows: 
1. Judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in favor of Fire Insurance 
Exchange and against Plaintiff Leigh Hardy Young, and the Complaint of Plaintiff 
against Fire Insurance Exchange and all claims of Plaintiff contained therein or in 
any way arising therefrom are hereby dismissed with prejudice, on the merits, no 
cause of action. 
2. Defendant is entitled to its costs. Defendant requests that th^CIerk-of the Court 
enter its costs 
DATED this 
in the amount of$ £l <?33 ^f 
tfaot Jfc- '.200^  
BYTH 
ADDENDUM C 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
Facsimile (801) 521-9700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEIGH YOUNG, aka HARDY, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
F1RF INST IRANCF EXCHANG1 , ] 
Defendant. ' 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
) PURSUANT TO RULE 59(a) 
Case No. 040915146 
i Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
CONIES NO\* ' the Plaintiff, Leigh Y oung, aka Hardy, b>< and through counsel, and 
hereby move the court for a new trial in the above captioned matter pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Trial Court ha s discretion to grant anew trial i inder one of the circumstance s 
specified in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon Lake Electric Associates Inc. 
vs I / Itrasy stems Western Const? uctc TS 1 nc, 76 ) I \2d 125 (I Jt. • V:pj:), 1988) I he trial court's i uling 
on a motion for new trial is renewed under an abuse of discretion standard, Crooks ton vs Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991). 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial is based on Rule 59(a)(7) an "error in the law;" 
and is supported by Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial, filed herewith. 
DATED this ZL day of January, 2007 
(e W. Call 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the p day of January, 2007,1 did mail, U.S. First Class, 
• n.-tdi.,'. .v..;un; . . .v _„. _ . ' .:.:; -_^ -p\ - :. . roregonig. viU:iCr • •* -• * "• '. z<i »..,. 
following: 
Barbara Maw 
515 East 100 South, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AN E • FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by r rp-
defendant sr^i-i I . yiy i^ ~ -i i >i^  tldintitt' M '. J J f >t i ML 'li.a^. 
The Court notes that the defendant has requested oral argument on this 
Motion,, Since the parties' written submissions adequately set forth 
their r esperru TT^ ] egEil p:>:-.t-ioi is, a hearing on the plaintiif's Motion is 
not necessary. Therefore, having reviewed the moving and responding 
memoranda, the Court rules as stated herein. 
In her Moti' on tl le p] a:i i itiff seeks a new trial under Rule 59 (a) (7) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which addresses rulings that are 
errors of law. The plaintiff asserts that durinq a -jnr^  ' "ic.l M - H i s 
ma11ei: J i idg s Freder:i c.1 :, who was previously assigned to tnis matter; 
erred as a matter of law when he entered a Judgment on Directed Verdict 
against her, According to the plaint"' " in
 (^> Fniderj "i oasco i h . > 
r_t_... :\ i in tiej ;airure to establish that the fire, for which she was 
seeking insurance coverage, was accidentally set. The plaintiff contends 
MINUTE KJNTRY 
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that this ruling was erroneous for the following reasons: (1) The 
insurance company had the burden of proof to establish that the fire was 
intentionally set or arranged and therefore excluded under the policy; 
(2) the issue of whether the fire was "accidentally" set was not 
determinative and (3) that expert testimony was unnecessary to establish 
that the fire was accidental. 
The defendant opposes the plaintiff's Motion, arguing that the 
plaintiff had the initial burden of establishing an entitlement to 
insurance coverage. The defendant maintains that since the plaintiff 
rested her case without presenting any expert testimony with regard to 
the cause and origin of the fire, Judge Frederick properly determined 
that she had not met her burden of proving that she was wrongfully denied 
coverage. 
After considering the arguments, the Court determines that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7) because 
Judge Frederick's directed verdict against her was not an error in law. 
The Court is satisfied that Judge Frederick appropriately allocated the 
initial burden of proof upon the plaintiff. As supported by the case law 
cited in the defendant's moving papers, the plaintiff/insured must first 
prove entitlement to insurance benefits before the defendant/insurance 
company has the burden of proving an exclusion (i.e. arson) as a defense. 
See e.g. Metric Construction Company v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co. , 2005 WL 2100929 (D~7 Utah) (u[T]he plaintiff has the burden of 
YOUNG V. FIRE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
proving that [its] loss comes within the coverage stated in the policv ' ) 
(citat:ions om :i 11ed) . The Co ar I is not persuadec by 11 Je plaintiit's-
arguments that she met this burden by simply establishing that her 
insurance policy was in effect at the time of the fire. Rather the 
plaintiff was r equired to put on evidence concerning the cause and origin 
of the fire. In the complete absence of such evidence, Judge Frederick, 
correctly ruled that the jury could not be " - r • c - - :" r' - ~~ 
: f tl le fire and properly entered a direct verdict against the plainnff. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
Th i s M i ni 11 e En t ry d e c i s i c n • • :i ] ] s t an d a s t h e 0rd e r c f t h 
- )cH*\ 
Dated this cAO"^ day of February, 2 0 07. 
kLuo A"TT 
KATE A. TOOMEY 
DISTRICT COURT 
YOUNG V. FIRE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this O^
 t day of February, 
2007: 
Budge W. Call 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 E. Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Barbara L. Maw 
Attorney for Defendant 
515 East 100 South, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^'VUioiW 
ADDENDUM E 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
:
-acs:miief80!) 521-9700 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
. .. JJCiAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPT. 
IN AMP ^OF SA! T l.AKI COUNTY STATE i)} ". "I AH 
. -.; i.-: .-J..NC:. aka HARDY, ) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Pia-'K'tf - •.' • ;: ) 
vs. ) 
Case No. 040915146 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE. ) Judge Kate A. Toemey 
Defendant/Appellee. ) 
NOTICE is hereb) given that the Plaintiff, Leigh Young, aka Hardy, hereby appeals to 
the Utah Supreme Court the 'v.:'. in. :--,:• on Directed AWdic! ent'-ied on Decejr • •.. <' 
this Court, including all preceding or interim orders, and the denial of Plaintiff s Motion ior New 
Trial entered hy the < 'MIII1 on iebruarv 28. 20'j/'. 
DATED this 'if day of March, 2006. 
>~ s? ---^ 
JBudge W. Call 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Apellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 ( b day of March, 2007,1 did mail, U.S. First Class, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing, NOTICE OF APPEAL, to the following: 
Barbara Maw 
515 East 100 South, Suite 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jpdi Haney 
Legal Assistant 
